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verdict, however, the jury finds the facts, while the court, by applying
the law to the facts, determines which party is entitled to judgment.
The need for detailed instructions to the jury is thus obviated. 1 .7 A
jury may also return a general verdict accompanied by answers to writ-
ten interrogatories based on specific questions posed by the court. The
use of special verdicts or general verdicts with answers to interroga-
tories is a matter entirely within the discretion of the court and, hence,
is reviewable only when the exercise of discretion is abused."8
Corbett v. Brown"9 is a recent case demonstrating the utility of
the special verdict. The plaintiff, an employee of a contractor who was
constructing a retaining wall on defendants' property, was injured
when he was struck by a large piece of concrete. His complaint alleged
both general negligence and negligence based upon failure to provide
a safe place to work. The defendants brought a third-party action
against the contractor, who in turn brought a fourth-party action
against the supplier of equipment. After concluding that the trial court
was in error when it held that contributory negligence was not available
as a defense to plaintiff's second cause of action, the court advised that:
Upon the new trial, if different theories of negligence should
again be invoked, the trial court would be well advised to make
use of the procedure available under the statute (CPLR 4111),
which permits the rendition of a special verdict or a general verdict
accompanied by written answers to written interrogatories. Thus,
if the defendants are again held liable for their negligence, the
basis of the jury's determination would be ascertained.
The determination of liability in the third-party and fourth-
party actions will depend upon the finding of negligence on the
defendants' part, if any, and, therefore, the dismissal of the third-
party and fourth-party complaints should be reversed. 120
ARTICLE 50- JUDGMENTS GENERALLY
CPLR 5004: Conflict over legal rate of interest.
CPLR 5004 declares that the interest rate on judgments shall be
at the "legal rate" unless otherwise provided by statute. The "legal" in-
terest rate has traditionally been found in the so-called "usury statute"
in the General Obligations Law.121 In 1968, the law was amended to
816 (1948); Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 261 (1920). But see
5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAaricE 49.05 (2d ed. 1968).
1174 WFINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLE, NEw YoRK CIVIL PRACrICE 4111.03.
118 Id.
19 32 App. Div. 2d 27, 299 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1969).
120 Id. at 32-33, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
121 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1964).
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provide that the legal rate of interest should be the rate prescribed by
the Banking Board pursuant to section 14a of the Banking Law.122
However, if no rate is set by the Board, the statute provides for a legal
rate of 6 percent. The Banking Law states that the Banking Board has
the authority to prescribe rates of interest at not less than 5 percent
nor more than 7.5 percent. Accordingly, on July 1, 1968, the Board
adopted a resolution declaring that the maximum rate of interest would
be 7.25 percent. The resolution was amended in February, 1969,
thereby raising the rate to 7.5 percent. 12
A principal source of conflict arises from the language in the
General Obligations Law which speaks of interest for a "loan or for-
bearance."'1 24 On November 21, 1968, the Attorney General rendered
an opinion125 in which he stated that the interest rate on money judg-
ments was 6 percent, notwithstanding the amendments to the General
Obligations Law and the Banking Law. This conclusion was arrived
at through reliance upon the language of a case decided prior to the
amendments construing the phrase "loan or forbearance" as being in-
applicable to purchase money mortgages.126 However, the Supreme
Court, Suffolk County, almost simultaneously held in Dime Savings
Bank of Brooklyn v. Carlozzo127 that the higher rate of interest was
applicable in computing interest on a note secured by a mortgage on
real estate which was subject to a foreclosure action.12
This conflict was further nurtured when the Special Term, New
York County, followed the Attorney General's opinion in holding that
the 6 percent rate was applicable to a money judgment since, once
entered, it was not a "loan or forbearance" even though it may have
been based upon one.129 Subsequently, in Gelco Builders v. Simpson
Factors Corp.,130 the supreme court in the same county held the higher
rate to be applicable to an action for inducing breach of contract. The
122 Id.:
1. The rate of interest, as computed pursuant to this title, upon the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action, except as otherwise provided
by law, shall be the rate prescribed by the banking board pursuant to section
'fourteen-a of the banking law, or if no rate has been so prescribed, six per centum
per annum.
123 For the current provision see 3 NYCRR 34.1 (1969).
124N.Y. GEN. OBLmATONS LAW § 5-501(1) (McKinney 1964). See note 122 supra.
125 Op. Awr'Y GEN. OF N.Y. (informal and unofficial), appearing in 161 N.Y.L.J. 11, Jan.
16, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
126 Mandelino v. Fribourg, 23 N.Y.2d 145, 242 N.E.2d 823, 295 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1968).
12758 Misc. 2d 821, 296 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969).
128 Accord, Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Giacomantonio, 59 Misc. 2d 704, 300 N.Y.S.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
129 Kay Lewis Enterprises v. Lewis Marshall, 161 N.Y.L.J. 102, May 26, 1969, at 17,
col. 1 (Spec. T. N.Y. County).
130 161 N.Y.L.J. 121, June 23, 1969, at 14, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
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Gelco court cited, as additional authority, an old Court of Appeals
decision which held that in an action for breach of a contract to borrow
money and repay at a specified rate of interest, the contract rate governs
until either the principal is paid or the contract is merged into a judg-
ment; thereafter, the "legal rate" would control.131
The most recent development in this controversy is Belcher v.
Kesten,3 2 wherein the Supreme Court, Queens County, further clari-
fied its earlier position13 3 in holding that 6 percent is the legal rate of
interest to be applied to a negligence judgment resulting from wrong-
ful death. Justice Clark ruled that the Banking Board's actions, and
hence the higher rate, were only applicable to commercial transactions
The deleterious effects of this unsettled state of the law will con-
tinue to be felt until some affirmative legislative steps are taken. Where
a choice of venue is possible, "forum shopping" will be encouraged
as litigants seek out "7.5 percent forums." It is hoped that the legisla-
ture will act as soon as possible to declare a uniform interest rate on
money judgments or, as suggested in Belcher, to set one standard for
judgments arising out of tortious acts and another for those arising
out of commercial transactions, in an attempt to achieve parity with
commercial interest rates. But if legislative action is not forthcoming,
it is submitted that the appellate courts should seize upon the first op-
portunity and set the controlling interest themselves.
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Seider action dismissed in federal court because absence of
"genuine" New York plaintiff eliminated a "debt" present in New
York.
In Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,134 a federal court of appeals
availed itself of the opportunity to limit the applicability of Seider v.
Roth'35 in actions instituted in the United States courts. In Farrell the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order 36 to vacate attachments
of defendants' liability insurance policies and dismiss thirteen suits
arising out of an airplane crash in North Carolina. The nominal
131 O'Brien v. Young, 95 N.Y. 428 (1884). See also Ferris v. Hard, 135 N.Y. 354, 32
N.E. 129 (1892).
132 162 N.Y.L.J. 20, July 29, 1969, at 11, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Queens County).
133 See Jamaica Say. Bank v. Giacomantonio, 59 Misc. 2d 704, 300 N.YS.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
134 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1969).
135 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See generally 7B MCKiNNEY'S
CPLR 5201, supp. commentaries 15-53 (1964-68). See also Note, Seider v. Roth: The Con-
stitutional Phase, 43 ST. JoHN'S L. R~v. 58 (1968) for a discussion of the Seider v. Roth
doctrine and some of the problems it evokes.
136 295 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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